Are product updates-in terms of producers ' 
Introduction
Updates have become an essential instrument in firms' product management repertoire. Once representing solely a means of providing bug fixes and minor improvements, updates are increasingly being used to provide consumers with new features over-the-air (Iyer and Venkatraman 2015; Porter and Heppelmann 2014; Yoo et al. 2010) . Such "feature updates" allow producers to add new functionality after a product's market release and while it is in use by consumers (Fleischmann et al. 2016; Tiwana 2015) . Since 2008, for example, Apple has added several hundreds of features to its iPhone, including the "Siri" personal assistant, "facetime" video calls or "iCloud", a feature to synchronize files across devices 1 . The increasing use of software makes feature updates also relevant for many products that traditionally relied little on information technology. For example, cars are increasingly software-based, enabling automakers to push substantial new features to their fleet without requiring consumers to bring their vehicle into the dealer's garage (Iyer and Venkatraman 2015; Svahn et al. forthcoming) . Tesla, for example, made a product update to improve driving performance (Taub 2016) . Even beyond cars and phones, any other products have become updateable, including televisions, washing machines, or books (Yoo et al. 2010) . In sum, updates enable producers to alter a product in use by consumers, instead of being limited to introducing features only over subsequent new product releases. In this sense, updates offer producers new possibilities in creating long-lasting demand and appeal for their products (Bharadwaj et al. 2013; Iyer and Venkatraman 2015) , eventually representing "a new set of strategic choices related to how value is created and captured" (Porter and Heppelmann 2014, p. 66) .
In this paper, we study the effects of updates on product demand and ratings. Updates are not trivial to study because they affect two distinct audiences: existing consumers of a product as well as potentially new consumers attracted by an update. Updates may be an effective means to increase demand for a product by attracting new consumers. As updates introduce new features, they may increase the likelihood of a product to enter the consideration set of consumers. This presumption stems foremost from traditional utility theory, which suggest that each additional product attribute that consumers perceive positively increases consumers' utility (Green and Srinivasan 1978; Lancaster 1971) . First empirical evidence seems to confirm this suggestion. In the context of browser add-ons, Tiwana (2015) finds frequent updates linked to higher downloads. Similarly, consumers seem to choose digital products that offer more features over comparable ones with fewer features (Meyer et al. 2008; Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001; Nowlis and Simonson 1996; Sela and Berger 2012) .
Reactions of existing consumers are less clear. Tiwana et al. (2015) find a link between updates and higher product ratings. Fleischmann et al. (2016) observe in an experimental setting that updates positively disconfirm existing consumers, leading to a greater intention to continue using a product. These contributions notwithstanding, there is anecdotal and empirical evidence that existing consumers react negatively. Anecdotes of product failures suggest for instance a "feature creep", meaning that the ongoing addition of features may result in bloated and over-complicated products, ultimately making consumers abandon a product (Surowiecki 2007) . In addition, simple Google searches yield hundreds of tutorials for how to undo recent updates of Instagram, Facebook, or Snapchat, to only name a few 2 . Research so far suggests both rational and behavioral drivers for negative reactions of existing consumers 3 . A rational reason might be that updates confront consumers with costs for switching from the product they know to the updated one (Chen and Hitt 2002; Farrell and Klemperer 2007; Klemperer 1987; Shapiro and Varian 1998) . Switching costs include transaction costs for an update (e.g., update fees, data plans) and learning costs (e.g., handling new features, changes in the user interface). If switching costs imposed by an update exceed potential utility, consumers may react negatively to the update. Apart from rational considerations, negative reactions may also reflect a behavioral phenomenon driven by psychological ownership (Pierce et al. 2001; Pierce and Delbecq 1977) , reluctance toward novelty (Boudreau et al. forthcoming) , endowment (Kahneman 2003; Kahneman et al. 1991) , or routine-seeking behavior (Oreg 2003) . For example, consumers may be reluctant toward novel things such as new features regardless of potential utility. In sum, however, conclusive empirical evidence on the effect of updates as well as the mechanisms driving these effects remains scarce.
Studying the effects of updates is difficult because it requires detailed product-level data that allows identifying changes made by updates and isolating the reactions of existing consumers and new consumers. An investigation should also account for unobservable and observable differences among products and producers that may confound consumer reactions. Finally, the above considerations underscore that such an investigation requires identifying causality. The decision to update is endogenous to producers, and likely to suffer from reverse causality. Because of this complexity, the accurate measurement of the consequences of updates has proven elusive.
Our study uses data on mobile apps, which allows us to track product-level information on consumer reactions (i.e., ratings, downloads, and reviews) as well as textual information on updates released by app developers (i.e., changelogs). Our dataset comprises a weekly balanced panel of 17,247 distinct apps listed in the Google Play Store U.S., the largest market for apps worldwide, over 24 weeks in 2016. To address endogeneity bias, we use propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Shadish et al. 2002) . We match apps that are updated (treatment group) to apps that are not updated (control group) but equivalent given our observational data. In our context, we have access to several thousands of potential control observations that we can use as inputs for the matching procedure, which bolsters our control group design (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Shadish et al. 2002) .
The resulting difference-in-differences estimates point toward two consistent findings. The first finding is that updates cause an increase in app downloads, thus confirming that updates may be an instrument for producers to stimulate new demand. All other things being equal, an update increases app downloads by 1.8% on average, plus or minus .3%. The second finding is that updates let ratings by existing consumers decline. All other things being equal, existing consumers rate an updated app 1.1% worse on average after an update. Both findings account for app and time heterogeneity, and remain robust to various matching configurations.
Whereas the first finding-updates attract new consumers-is in line with prior evidence (Fleischmann et al. 2016; Tiwana 2015) , the second finding-updates alienate existing consumers-represents a new phenomenon. What explains the discount in existing consumers' evaluations? To corroborate our findings, we sought to tease out whether rational reasons or behavioral drivers underlie the negative reactions. While it is infeasible to design a formal test, we construct and explore counterfactuals. Empirical support for either mechanism-rational or behavioral-has unique implications for producers in managing product updates. If we would observe that consumers' reactions are mostly driven by rational reasons, producers may have actionable patterns to avoid these reactions, such as reducing the economic costs associated with an update. If we observe that negative reactions to updates are foremost a behavioral phenomenon, producers' leeway is limited, probably facing a trade-off between attracting new consumers and potentially alienating existing consumers.
We observe little evidence that is in line with economic reasoning. Speaking for economic reasoning is the observation that negative reactions appear to broadly increase with the extent of change invoked by an update, yet the effects remain only marginally significant and of little size. Speaking for a behavioral driver is the text analysis of reviews submitted by consumers. If existing consumers' reactions were behaviorally motivated, we would expect this to be reflected in consumers' vocabulary. We use standard semantic text analysis software to scan consumer reviews for the density of affective words. All other things being equal, existing consumers' reviews for updated apps increase in affective voice (i.e., containing emotional rather than cognitive words) for updated apps. Taken together, these findings let us speculate that negative reactions to feature updates are only partly actionable for producers, at least in our very context. The possibility of a producer-side trade-off regarding updates exists, and requires future research.
Theoretical Foundation

Feature Updates
Updates are "self-contained modules of software that are provided to the user for free in order to modify or extend a software after it has been rolled out and is already in use" (Fleischmann et al. 2016, p. 84) . Updates are no stand-alone products but rather are integrated into the base product (Clements and Northrop 2002; Ulrich 1995) . In this paper we are interested in product updates that add new functionalities to a product. We refer to such updates as "feature updates" and use the term "update" for the sake of brevity. An example for feature updates are Apple's regular updates for its iPhone. The 2016 update for instance brought more than 50 new features 4 .
Departing from the notion of new feature introductions, updates closely relate to various concepts in software management, product development, and marketing. Prior work in software management studied updates as part of producers' efforts in keeping products operational (Banker et al. 1998; Cavusoglu et al. 2008) , often in terms of modifications that correct faults and vulnerabilities (e.g., bug fixes, patches or hotfixes) or marginal product modifications (e.g., improvements in stability, security or performance). Scholars particularly investigated the extent and costs of updates (e.g., Banker et al. 1998; Barry et al. 2006; Kannan et al. 2016; Telang and Wattal 2007) . From this perspective, updates are investments into existing products when, for example, errors are uncovered and must be fixed, new technology must be integrated, or its reliability must be improved (Banker et al. 1998; Kannan et al. 2016) . However, these studies provide little insight in updates that introduce new features. Work that particularly studied feature updates comes mostly from software development and focused the supply side of updates in general (Clements and Northrop 2002) . Insight in demand-side reactions to updates are comparably scarce (Fleischmann et al. 2016; Tiwana 2015) .
Work on product development investigated various related concepts, in particular upgrades, generations, and variants. Upgrades describe the replacement of a part of or the entire product with a new generation (Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Lawless and Anderson 1996; Ulrich 1995) . Upgrades differ from our notion of updates in two regards. First, upgrades usually introduce various new features and take place over longer periods, whereas updates are comparably smaller in scope and take place more frequently. A classic example is the introduction of successive generations of video game consoles, such as Sony's introduction of the fourth generation of its PlayStation in 2013. Second, upgrades usually come with costs for obtaining the upgrade. Various studies on updates concern pricing or whether and when firms should introduce updates to avoid cannibalizing preceding generations (Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Mehra et al. 2012) . By contrast, updates usually do not involve substantial compatibility issues (Shapiro and Varian 1998) .
Updates also relate to the concept of product variants. Product variants are similar models of the same product that vary over some aspects (Krishnan and Ulrich 2001) . Variants are horizontal differentiations of a product, whereas updates alter a particular product in use over time, independent of its organization in higher-level structures.
Finally, updates relate to studies on consumer choice and evaluation of product enhancements (e.g., Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001; Nowlis and Simonson 1996; Sela and Berger 2012) . Product enhancements broadly describe new capabilities or attributes of a product (Meyer et al. 2008; Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001) . Work in this stream seeks to predict successful enhancements based on consumer preferences. Conceptually, enhancements relate to both successive generations of products as well as individual products being introduced. These studies provide, however, little information on consumer reactions to updates. In addition, these studies are interested in consumers' decisions prior to ownership rather than providing insights in how updates affect evaluations of existing consumers.
Consumer Reactions to Feature Updates
Updates are evaluated by two distinct audiences, which also require differentiated theoretical considerations. One evaluating audience consists of new consumers attracted by an update. The other evaluating audience encompasses existing consumers of a product. The main argument of our paper is that new consumers and existing consumers react differently to updates. In the following, we discuss this argument in more detail.
Feature Updates Attract New Consumers
Feature updates may attract new consumers by making it more likely that the product enters the consideration sets of consumers. This presumption comes from traditional utility theory, which has modeled consumer preferences using an additive utility function (Lancaster 1971) . Utility models assume each additional product attribute that consumers perceive positively to increase consumers' utility. This idea finds itself implemented in many market research techniques, such as the conjoint analysis or discrete choice models (e.g., Green and Srinivasan 1978) . Because these models predict consumer outcomes based on expected utilities or part-worths for each product feature, the conclusion is that each positively valued feature adds to the success of a product, compared to not having the feature 5 .
Empirical evidence supports the prediction that consumers choose products that offer more features over comparable products with fewer features (Meyer et al. 2008; Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001; Sela and Berger 2012) . One consistent observation is that adding attributes to a product increases consumers' perceptions of its capability, resulting in improved product evaluations before ownership (Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001) . Consequently, feature updates are likely to attract new consumers, since they make the product more likely to be considered by a larger number of consumers. Thus, we argue:
Hypothesis 1: A feature update increases the number of new consumers of the product.
Feature Updates Alienate Existing Consumers
Reactions of existing consumers are less clear. Various evidence and arguments suggest negative reactions. To structure our discussion, we classify these arguments as rational (economic) and behavioral. "Rational" refers to the argument that actors, in terms of consumers, maximize their utility and are capable of gathering and evaluating all information for this purpose themselves (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . "Behavioral", by contrast, denotes systematic biases in an actor's decision-making that cannot, or only in a very limited way, explained by rational logics (Kahneman 2003) 6 .
From an economic perspective, existing consumers face costs of switching from the product they know to the updated product (Farrell and Klemperer 2007; Klemperer 1987; Nilssen 1992; Shapiro and Varian 1998) . If switching costs imposed by an update exceed the obtained utility, consumers may react negatively to the update. Based on Nilssen (1992) and Klemperer (1987) , there are at least two types of switching costs relevant for our consideration of updates, namely transaction costs and learning costs 7 . Transaction costs are immediate costs incurred by the update, in terms of the time, effort, and money in changing from the original product to its updated version (Chen and Hitt 2002; Klemperer 1987; Whitten and Wakefield 2006) . Transaction costs include fees producers charge for the update. For example, some providers of mobile games charge for new game levels and gimmicks 8 . Other transaction costs incur for data plans or opportunity costs associated with installing an update and fixing potential errors encountered in this process 9 . Learning costs represent the effort required by a consumer "to reach the same level of comfort or facility with a new product as they had for an old product" (Chen and Hitt 2002, p. 257) . For example, a feature update for a banking app might introduce a new verification procedure for making money transfers, which requires consumers to understand and learn the new procedures before being again able to transfer money. Another example might be that feature updates imply a reorganization of the user interface, eventually confronting consumers with costs for learning and understanding the handling the product.
Various studies yielded evidence for consumers' economic considerations. Several studies document learning costs in the context of product features (Meyer et al. 2008; Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001; Thompson et al. 2005; Thompson and Norton 2011) . Thompson et al. (2005) asked study participants to choose between three variants of a digital device. More than sixty per cent of participants chose the variant with the most features. Similarly, when the researchers gave subjects the chance to customize their product, freely choosing from twenty-five features, subjects also maximized features. However, when the researchers asked the subjects to use the device, subjects evaluated products with many features more negatively than the ones with less features. Mukherjee and Hoyer (2001) observe in the case of high-complexity products that additional features reduced product ratings because consumers made learning-cost inferences about these features. Finally, the findings of Meyer et al. (2008) suggest that while consumers are more likely to adopt products with added features, they subsequently avoid using these features due to inferred learning costs. In sum, switching costs imposed by an update might explain negative reactions of existing consumers.
Negative reactions of existing consumers may also represent a behavioral phenomenon that exists aside from rationality. If the negative reactions are behavioral, consumers react negatively even if updates provided new capabilities and implying no costs at all. Among others, behavioral drivers include psychological ownership (Pierce et al. 2001; Pierce and Delbecq 1977) , reluctance toward novelty (Boudreau et al. forthcoming) , and routine-seeking behavior (Oreg 2003) . These behaviors have been documented across disciplines, and they provide theoretical arguments that existing consumers evaluate feature updates negatively. For example, routine-seeking behavior may trigger negative reactions from consumers to a feature update because consumers might keeping the "status quo" of their product rather than being provided with potentially useful new features that disrupt their routine when using the app. In sum, we argue:
Hypothesis 2: A feature update decreases existing consumers' evaluations of the product.
Method
Context and Research Design
We test our hypotheses in the context of mobile apps. Apps are a type of software for a specific and particular purpose, optimized for mobile devices (Ghose et al. 2013; Ghose and Han 2011) . Typical examples of apps are email, calendar, stock market, and weather. Apps optimize the appearance of displayed data, taking into consideration the screen size and resolution (Ghose et al. 2013) . The functionality of mobile apps is usually limited by the unique characteristics of mobile devices: they have comparably little processing power, are controlled by touch gestures, and used "on the go" (Ghose et al. 2013 ).
We particularly study mobile apps that run on Google's Android platform. At the time of our study, more than 80% of all smartphones worldwide run Android (Gartner, 2016) . This setting has the advantage that we can collect data directly from the Google Play Store, the largest store for Android apps 10 . In Google Play, consumers can compare, rate, review, and obtain apps (Salz 2014) . Producers can update their apps at any time. Updates are rolled out immediately and automatically to existing consumers "over-the-air". Consumers are not charged any direct costs for an update, yet producers may adjust upfront prices or inapp prices along with an update.
Figure 1 illustrates our research design, which resembles a quasi-experiment. To allow for causal inference, we employ a matching strategy (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Dehejia and Wahba 2002; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) . Matching strategies pair each observation that experiences the treatment of interest at a given point in time (in our case, apps that experience an update) with one or several similar observations that do not experience the treatment at that time (the control group). We observe each app at four subsequent points in time: two weeks before the update (t-2), one week before the update (t-1), one week after the update (t+1), and two weeks after the update (t+2). We estimate the effects of updates by calculating the difference-in-differences (DID) between updated and not-updated apps, before and after the update (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Bertrand et al. 2004 ). 
Data and Variables
We obtained a list of all apps in the Google Play Store as of June 2016 from a mobile analytics firm. We selected a random sample of 100,000 apps from this list, for which we collected app-specific information, including ratings, updates, prices, and text reviews, in an automated way in a weekly panel format. We filtered the obtained dataset as follows. Besides apps, Google Play lists content, including television shows, music, and books, and hedonic applications, including games. In order to ensure comparability, we excluded apps labeled as "books & references", "comics", "education", "libraries & demos", "news & magazines", "wallpaper", "widgets", and "games". To ensure comparability, we dropped apps with less than ten downloads. In the following, we discuss the variables included in our study in more detail.
DOWNLOADS.
To assess whether updates attract new consumers we use the number of downloads for an app. Google Play, as other app markets, does not provide precise measures of app downloads. Instead, Google gives a categorical indicator of the number of downloads (e.g., 5-10, 100-500, 500,000-1,000,000).
To obtain a more detailed measure of downloads, we combined information on download intervals with the number of ratings for an app. In order to submit a rating, users must have downloaded an app, so the number of ratings can be considered a conservative lower bound to consumer demand . The resulting variable DOWNLOADS is then the mean between the midpoint of the download interval for an app and its number of ratings, which we logged 11 .
RATING. We assess consumer reactions to updates by the rating consumers give to apps. Consumers may evaluate apps by rating it from one to five "stars", where one star represents a low rating and five stars represent a high rating of the app. Apps with higher ratings are perceived to fulfill user expectations, have an agreeable and engaging interface, and are well-suited to audiences' needs (Salz 2014) . Consumers can renew their ratings after an app update, which allows us to distinguish between ratings of existing consumers versus new consumers (Salz 2014) . The Google Play Store provides the mean rating of all consumers, rounded to one decimal, which we report as RATING.
Focal predictors (UPDATE and AFTER).
To identify feature updates, we hired two independent assistants who manually inspected the changelogs (or, release notes) app producers publish along an update. In changelogs, producers describe key aspects of an app update (cf. Kemerer and Slaughter 1999) . Prior work used version numbers (e.g., 2.0, 2.1) to identify updates, which may serve as a proxy of feature updates (e.g., Tiwana 2015) . Although it is an informal convention that integer increases in version numbers indicate major changes (Kemerer and Slaughter 1999) , this standard is not enforced in many contexts and subject to certain ambiguity. Moreover, version numbers do not allow inferring the extent of features added to an app. By contrast, changelogs provide detailed insights into the changes made (Kemerer and Slaughter 1999) . In the Google Play Store, changelogs are displayed below the product description in a section entitled "What's new", which makes them an important aspect of producers' communication. Changelogs are limited to 500 characters, which requires producers to precisely describe the update (Salz 2014 ).
The central predictor in our model is the dichotomous variable UPDATE, which is one if the focal app was updated with a new feature and zero otherwise. DID analyses require a second indicator for distinguishing the periods before and after the event that is studied. Thus, we include the dichotomous indicator AFTER in our models, which is one for the weeks after the update. The DID estimator is then given by interacting AFTER with UPDATE.
We construct further variables to gain insights into economic and behavioral reasoning behind negative ratings. First, the variable FEATURES ADDED is the count of the features added in an update. Second, we count the number of words in the changelog, as captured in WORDS IN CHANGELOG. Third, we obtained the time since the last feature addition. The variable WEEKS SINCE LAST UPDATE counts the number of days since the last update. Fourth, we measure direct price changes associated with an update (PRICE, continuous, in US-Dollar). The variable FREE is an indicator of apps that charge no up-front price.
Finally, consumers can include text reviews with their ratings, and these reviews may offer further insights. If reactions to updates are behaviorally driven, consumers' textual responses may give an indication. To analyze consumer reviews we implemented natural language processing techniques. We use the standard semantic text analysis software LIWC (Pennebaker et al. 2015) to capture major text semantics. We are particularly interested in capturing consumer reasoning in a review. LIWC offers for this purpose the category "affective processes" (Pennebaker et al. 2015) . Technically, each category consists of a list of identifying words. LIWC scores the wordlists against a text, and subsequently assigns a numerical score depending on how many of the category words were observed in a text. The category we employ in our analyses is "affective mechanism". It includes 1393 word stems, among them "happy", "worried", "hate" or "ugly". In a five-word text, "I hate the new update", the output by LIWC is 20 (per cent) for the affective mechanism dictionary (i.e., one affective word "hate" divided by a total of five words in the text, and multiplying by 100%). Before conducting the LIWC analyses, we cleansed the reviews. We removed fill 11 We are aware of the method proposed by Garg and Telang (2013) for inferring app demand from publicly available data on these apps. This method is not applicable in our case because it requires data on app ranks, in terms of the rank of an app in the top charts (e.g., top paid, top free, or top grossing). Ranks are not given in our case as we are looking at a representative sample of apps from Google Play, and most apps in our sample are not ranked.
words from the text, lemmatized each word, and removed reviews that were not written in English language. We then score the affective mechanism dictionary against consumers' review texts for each app-week. This procedure resulted in a numerical score assigned to each app-week, which indicates the mean score for the affective category. We include this score as the continuous variable AFFECTIVE in our analyses.
Although LIWC seems to find increasing adoption by scholars (e.g., Golder and Macy 2011; Lin et al. 2013; Lin and Viswanathan 2015) , researchers also criticized its accuracy 12 . To bolster the external validity of the LIWC classifications, we selected a random sample of 200 reviews across apps and hired three assistants to judge the reviews regarding affective mechanisms based on the definition provided in Pennebaker et al. (2015) . To simplify their coding process, we asked the assistants to rank the affectivity of a review on a scale from one to five. Our assistants agreed with the LIWC coding in the majority of the cases as an interrater agreement of .93 pointed out.
Controls.
We estimate our models with app-level and time (i.e., week) fixed effects. App fixed effects adjust for static differences among apps (e.g., functionality, usability, producer etc.). Time effects control for external events (e.g., announcements by Google) or trends (e.g., an increasing number of apps are published), in terms of that app producers vary their decisions to update in response to temporal events or short-term trends.
Matched Sample Construction
We followed Shadish et al. (2002) to build our matched set of control apps. We relied on propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) . Propensity score matching (PSM) uses observational characteristics to predict the treatment. Each observation is assigned a conditional probability of experiencing the treatment (here, releasing an update). Econometrically, the assigned probability-or propensity score-represents the predicted value that is given by regressing the treatment indicator on a set of theoretically relevant predictor variables (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) . Each treatment observation is then paired with control observations that do observationally not differ from each other at the time of the treatment (Dehejia and Wahba 2002; Shadish et al. 2002) .
We match on observational characteristics and the time of the update. The critical task in both PSM is to choose matching criteria. Matching criteria are inherently context-specific (Angrist and Pischke 2009). Although our context has received some attention in prior literature (e.g., Ghose et al. 2013; Ghose and Han 2011; Yin et al. 2014) , evidence is scarce when it comes to indicators of updating. We therefore followed the procedure employed by Pahnke et al. (2015) and used informal interviews with producers, analysts, and industry experts to derive suitable matching criteria 13 . The interviews converged on a number of appspecific factors. The interviews revealed that updates are costly for producers. Producers may thus tend to invest only in "promising" apps, depending on downloads and ratings received. Thus, we used DOWNLOADS and RATING as criteria for the matching procedure. Producers also seemed to update apps more often for which they charged an upfront price. Thus, we added PRICE as a matching criterion. While not evident from our interviews, we also added WEEKS SINCE LAST UPDATE as a matching criterion to account for temporal differences. We want to note at this point that our use of a comparably few matching criteria is in line with a growing number of studies that suggest logit-based propensity scores with few polynomial terms to work well in practice (Dehejia and Wahba 1999) .
To generate propensity scores, we constructed a logit model predicting the likelihood of UPDATE using the "psmatch2" function in Stata 14. PSM is particularly robust when applied on large samples as in our case because a sufficient number of control observations is available (Shadish et al. 2002) . We used nearest neighbor matching without replacement in the first week of the pretreatment period. There is no standard procedure for matching (Dehejia and Wahba 2002) . Recent findings indicate that nearest neighbor matching estimates produce lower standard errors, especially when propensity scores between treatment and control groups overlap (Dehejia and Wahba 2002) . We matched one treatment app with four control apps, with the aim to limit the loss of information characteristic of 1:1 matching and augmenting the 12 Several prior studies applied LIWC for semantic text analysis before (e.g., Golder and Macy 2011; Lin et al. 2013; Lin and Viswanathan 2015) . 13 We conducted the interviews as part of a larger, exploratory study on mobile app developers. We interviewed various app developers across industries, and encompassing both single-man businesses and professional ones. precision of the estimated treatment effect (Shadish et al. 2002) . Ultimately, the decision of the matching ratio is a trade-off between variance and errors. We conduct sensitivity analyses of our matched control group in the robustness section of this paper, also by comparing results obtained from various matching ratios. 
Empirical Model
We used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on app to estimate the following baseline equation:
The subscripts i and t index for app and week, respectively. The dependent variable is yi,t. UPDATEi is an indicator variable for whether app i is in the treatment group, AFTERt equals 1 if the current week is after the treatment, Vi are app fixed effects and Tt are time fixed effect. The DID coefficient of interest is β1, which can be interpreted as the relative change of the treatment group compared to the control group, caused by the treatment 15 .
Results
Main Results
We first turn toward analyzing the consequences of feature updates for app downloads. We estimate equation (1) with DOWNLOADS as dependent variable, which gives us the effect of feature updates on app downloads. Table 2 shows the results. In Model 1, we observe that the interaction of interest, AFTER x UPDATE is positive and significant. All other things being equal, a feature update increases downloads by approximately 1.8% on average, plus minus .3%. This finding indicates that feature updates attract new consumers, supporting Hypothesis 1.
How do existing consumers react to feature updates in terms of ratings? We estimate equation (1) with RATING as dependent variable, in terms of the effect of feature updates on ratings by existing and new consumers. To isolate the effect of product updates on existing consumers' ratings, we control for the increase in an app's new consumers with DOWNLOADS. In Model 2, the coefficient of AFTER x UPDATE now gives the effect of feature updates on existing consumers' ratings. The coefficient of AFTER x UPDATE is negative and strongly significant. The robustness section provides evidence that the results also hold when using period-to-period differences in DOWNLOADS as a predictor. All other things being equal, existing consumers rate an app 1.1% more negative after an update, on average. Thus, existing consumers react negatively to feature updates, supporting Hypothesis 2. 
Further Analyses
So far, our findings indicate that consumers rate updated apps worse than before the update. What explains this discount? Our literature background presented economic and behavioral explanations, which we seek to explore in our data in the following. As it is infeasible to design a formal test that allows fully rejecting either economic or behavioral reasons, we conduct counterfactual analyses. We warrant, however, that our analyses do not allow definite conclusions. Rather we conduct these analyses to provide a more detailed picture of the mechanisms in place.
Economic Reasoning
If economic reasoning is the driver behind the negative reactions, then we should observe consumers to react more negatively, the more switching costs an update invokes. If consumers react negatively almost regardless of the extent of switching costs, then we would have an indicator for a behavioral driver. We first consider whether consumers react more negatively when an update adds more features. If economic reasoning is driving consumer reactions, then ratings should be more negatively the more features an update introduces. Econometrically we use a count of the features added in an update, NUMBER OF FEATURES, and WORDS IN CHANGELOG, as a broader proxy for changes invoked by an update. As a second counterfactual, we consider whether consumers react more negatively, the more frequent updates occur. If rational reasons are driving the reactions, then we should expect that more frequently occurring updates magnify the negative effects. Econometrically we use a count of the weeks that have passed since the last update, WEEKS SINCE LAST UPDATE. To estimate the three models, we use our standard DID model from equation (1) and interact the DID estimator with NUMBER OF FEATURES, WORDS IN CHANGELOG, and WEEKS SINCE LAST UPDATE, respectively. Table 3 shows the results. Model 1 is the baseline from our main results. First, we add the interaction of the DID estimate and NUMBER OF FEATURES in Model 2. The coefficient of the resulting three-way interaction gives the effect of an update on RATING, depending on the number of features introduced by the update. The coefficient of AFTER x UPDATE x NUMBER OF FEATURES is marginally different from zero and insignificant, indicating that there is no relationship between the number of features introduced by an update and negative reactions of existing consumers. We want to caution at this point that most updates only introduce a single feature (see Table 1 ), thus providing limited variance in this regard. In Model 3, the coefficient of AFTER x UPDATE x WORDS IN CHANGELOG is marginally significant, yet remains of no meaningful size to allow interpretation. We add the interaction with WEEKS SINCE LAST UPDATE in Model 4. The coefficient is significant, indicating that ratings become more negatively the more time has passed since the last update, which is in contrast to our expectation that updates that are more frequent cause more negative ratings. In sum, these analyses offer little evidence that economic reasoning is the main cause of the observed effects. Table shows the OLS regression results from a matched-sample design. The regressions include main effects and first-level interactions that we omit for the sake of brevity. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered on app and given in parentheses. N = 68,988 app-weeks. * , ** , *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1%, and .1% levels, respectively.
We might also find an indicator for economic reasoning when considering consumer reactions depending transaction costs invoked by updates. If consumers reacted negatively due to economic reasons, they should react more negatively to updates when they had initially paid for an app. We used split-sample analyses to compare consumer reactions in the case when consumers had paid upfront price for an app (FREE) or the app was based on in-app purchases (IN-APP) . In sum, the estimates in Table 4 show little evidence of economic reasoning behind the negative reactions. However, Models 1 and 2 indicate the opposite. Existing consumers of paid apps react less negatively. Consistent with these observations are the estimates of Models 3 and 4. Apps with in-app purchases show less negative reactions of existing consumers. Table shows the OLS regression results from a matched-sample design. FE means fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered on app and given in parentheses. Observations are appweeks. * , ** , *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1%, and .1% levels, respectively.
Behavioral Motivation
If the negative reactions of existing consumers are a behavioral phenomenon, then the semantical analyses of consumer reviews should provide us with an indicator. To explore behavioral drivers, we assessed the semantic text analyses of consumer reviews. If updates cause an increase in the usage of affective words in reviews of existing consumers, then we should have an indicator of a behavioral bias. Figure 2 plots AFFECT for updated and not updated apps, before and after the update. The plot shows an increasing number of affective words (e.g., hate, annoyed, bad) in consumer reviews for updated apps, whereas control apps remain almost at pre-update levels. The figure indicates an increase in affective vocabulary in existing consumers' reviews for updated apps 16 .
Econometrically, we run our main DID model in equation (1) predicting AFFECT. Model 1 in Table 5 shows the resulting estimates. Accounting for app and time heterogeneity, consumer reviews appear in more affective voice compared to prior the update. Second, we conducted regression analyses, in which we added AFFECT as a covariate to observe its effect on RATING, as well as on the treatment effect given by AFTER x UPDATE. Model 2 gives the baseline of our main estimation. Model 3 adds AFFECT and the corresponding control for the treatment group. In Model 3, the decrease in RATING we observed in our main results appears to correlate with the treatment effect. The coefficient of AFTER x UPDATE decreases in magnitude, while remaining strongly significant. The coefficient of AFFECT is significant. In sum, these observations speak for the existence of behavioral drivers underlying consumer reactions. Table shows the OLS regression results from a matched-sample design. Main effect of AFFECT included in Model 3 but not shown. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered on app and given in parentheses. N = 68,988 app-weeks. * , ** , *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1%, and .1% levels, respectively. 16 We are aware of the selection biases inherent in consumer reviews as described in (Hu et al. forthcoming) . Please note that our DID design allows us comparing consumer reviews for updated and non-updated apps, both before and after the update-in this sense, we are interested in trends in consumer reviews, holding initial selection constant. 
Robustness
Our empirical strategy shares most of the advantages and disadvantages of a standard DID. On the one hand, it allows us to control for both app and time-period fixed effects so that all time-invariant differences across apps-such as initial functionality, target consumers, revenue models-and weeks-such as temporal peeks in downloads or sales offerings by producers-are controlled for. On the other hand, the strategy relies on a number of assumptions that we want to assess in the following (Bertrand et al. 2004 ). Due to space limitations, we cannot report all estimates in detail. The calculations are available from the authors on request. The robustness of our findings depends on the effectiveness of our matching procedure. We begin by assessing the robustness of our assumption that updated and not updated apps are comparable (Angrist and Pischke 2009) . We therefore compared both groups along observational data. We do not observe significant differences for the outcomes of interest in this study.
Our models also assume parallel trends between updated and not updated apps (Angrist and Pischke 2009) .
To assess the plausibility of this assumption, we followed Bertrand et al. (2004) and estimated models in which we interacted a continuous time indicator (TREND) with the treatment indicator for the pretreatment weeks. The estimates show no considerable differences in time trends prior the update for DOWNLOADS. There is a trend in ratings but this trend is not significantly different for updated apps.
We also want to assess the degree to which our estimates are an artifact of our chosen matching ratio. Although our final sample is the result of various analyses and trade-offs between variance and errors, we want to compare our estimates to the ones obtained via various matching ratios. In sum, the standard errors and effect sizes vary little across the models, suggesting that the chosen matching influences our estimates only marginally, as Table 6 shows. Table shows the OLS regression results from a matched-sample design. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered on app and given in parentheses. Observations are app-weeks. * , ** , *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1%, and .1% levels, respectively.
Our models assume that no other changes occur at the same time as the treatment. Our temporally staggered research design naturally controls for such false positives by varying the treatment over time. In addition, we implemented placebo tests that demonstrate that our estimated treatment effects are not artifacts of temporal confounders or simply of the data structure (Bertrand et al. 2004) . We randomly assigned a treatment variable to apps in our dataset, and then repeated our primary models. We repeated this procedure 60 times. The models resulting from these runs are insignificant and their coefficients are considerably smaller than our true data estimates. Figure 3 illustrates the results from this procedure. Our dependent variable represents a proxy for true downloads of an app. While it is almost impossible to obtain true estimates for app downloads, we sought to assess the validity of our measure of app downloads, i.e., DOWNLOADS. We collected data from AppAnnie, which is one of the largest providers of mobile app analytics. AppAnnie data is widely used in the industry and regularly referenced in the trade press, for instance in the Wall Street Journal or Bloomberg. We collected App Annie download estimates for a sample of 500 apps of our dataset, and then correlated our measure of downloads (DOWNLOADS) with the App Annie estimates. Both measures are correlate (.72) and the correlation coefficient is significant at the p<.01 level.
Due to issues of serial correlation in panel-based DID models, Bertrand et al. (2004) recommend assessing the robustness of the obtained estimates using bootstrapped standard errors. We block bootstrap the standard errors in our main models. The bootstrapped estimates are comparable in magnitude and significance, thus suggesting little relevance of serial correlation for our estimates.
We also varied our model and assessed whether using the period-to-period differences in downloads leads to different effects on RATING. The resulting estimates remain comparable in size and significance, as Table  7 shows. 
Discussion and Conclusion
Main Findings
Do updates cause greater product demand and appeal? In our data, updates appeared as an instrument to create new demand. All other things being equal, we find a feature update to increase downloads by approximately 1.8% on average. When considering the reactions of existing consumers, we found evidence of negative effects. All other things being equal, an update causes ratings of existing consumers to decline by approximately 1.1% on average, when compared with their ratings prior the update and to similar but not updated apps. These findings remained robust to various matching strategies and parameters, and account for app and time heterogeneity. In subsequent analyses, we found little support for economic reasons behind the negative reactions of existing consumers. Rather, our findings support the alternative explanation that negative reactions of consumers are a behavioral phenomenon.
Research Implications
This paper directly responds to calls for understanding the management of digital products (Bharadwaj et al. 2013; Iyer and Venkatraman 2015; Yoo et al. 2010 ) and the "strategic choices related to how value is created and captured" (Porter and Heppelmann 2014, p. 66) . The strategic choice we investigated is whether firms should invest in feature updates over the lifetime of their products-a phenomenon that has received increasing interest of scholars and managers. Our findings align with the observation in prior work that updates attract new consumers, yet object the observation that updates are perceived positively by existing consumers (Fleischmann et al. 2016; Tiwana 2015) . In this sense, our results add to this stream by suggesting a producer-side trade-off: updates may attract new consumers but may also alienate existing consumers. Producer-side strategies that effectively mitigate existing consumers' reactions are a promising area of future research.
Our paper sought to disentangle economic and behavioral drivers behind consumer reactions. If future research can confirm our finding of behavioral triggers behind existing consumers' negative reactions, producers' possibilities in reducing negative reactions might be limited. Here, we are left to speculate whether these reactions reflect an "update resistance", which might be a phenomenon of interest for product management (Iyer and Venkatraman 2015; Yoo et al. 2010) , consumer choice (e.g., Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001; Nowlis and Simonson 1996; Sela and Berger 2012) , and software management literatures (e.g., Banker et al. 1998; Barry et al. 2006; Kannan et al. 2016; Telang and Wattal 2007) . The behavioral mechanisms actually underlying such an update resistance-such as reluctance toward novelty (Boudreau et al. forthcoming) or endowment (Kahneman 2003 )-require further decoding in future studies. Interviews with consumers and subsequent, experimental testing may help teasing out these mechanisms. Finally, this paper adds a facet to the potential fields of application of behavioral economics within information systems (Goes 2013) , namely consumer reactions in the management of software-based products.
It is important to consider the contextual nature of our results, and to discuss the extent to which they would generalize to contexts other than mobile apps. Whereas we expect our main result, in terms of updates attracting new consumers, to be stable, it is possible that the valence of economic and behavioral drivers for existing consumers' negative reactions is context-dependent. It seems plausible, for example, that economic considerations find greater valence in contexts characterized by technology that is inherently more complex than the mobile apps we studied. A second aspect of generalizability concerns our research design that allows accounting for product rather than consumer heterogeneity. While our research design is comparably robust in accounting for product heterogeneity by varying over products and over time, our research design does not allow detailed inferences on consumer characteristics. Additional data on on existing consumers might help us understand the negative reactions.
Finally, our context offered insights in the mobile app industry (Bresnahan et al. 2014; Ghose and Han 2011; Yin et al. 2014) . Our study illustrates that strategies in this new market appear to depend on substantial experimentation. Designing and understanding product strategies in mobile markets is complex, and our study represents a building block in understanding them. From a broader perspective, this paper sheds light not only the mobile app industry but also the broader area of managing digitalized "smart" products, in terms of products that are combinations of hardware, software, data storage, and connectivity (Iyer and Venkatraman 2015; Porter and Heppelmann 2014) .
Managerial Implications
Our findings suggest actionable patterns for managers. First, our findings support the effectiveness of feature updates in attracting new consumers to a product. The purposeful design of feature updates to attract particular consumer segments may allow producers to continuously adjust their products to various consumer groups as well as to be a "moving target" for competition. Second, our data do only little support economic reasons behind existing consumers' negative reactions. At least in our very context, the success of mitigation strategies focused on reducing the switching costs invoked by a feature update-such as reducing the extent and frequency of an update or providing guidelines and tutorials-might be limited. As we noted earlier, however, contexts other than mobile apps might show a greater valence of economic reasoning.
